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Comment
The Admissibility of Novel Scientific
Evidence in New York State: Has New York
Been Left Out to Frye?
"No one will deny that the law should in some way effectively use
expert knowledge wherever it will aid in settling disputes. The
only question is as to how it can do so best."'
I. Introduction
For the past seventy years, the majority standard by which
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence has been adjudged
is the Frye standard.2 Introduced by the landmark decision of
Frye v. United States,3 the standard has evolved in most courts
to require any novel scientific theory or technique to be gener-
ally accepted by the scientific community before being admitted
into evidence. 4 The Frye standard has been used to determine
the admissibility of polygraph examinations,5 voiceprint analy-
1. Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 40 (1901).
2. The literature existent on the Frye standard and its effects on such admissi-
bility is extensive and pervasive. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELMED, ScIENTrIFic EVIDENCE § 1-5, at 9-31 (1986 & Supp. 1991); Paul C.
Gianneli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1197 (1980).
3. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
4. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5, at 9-10; Giannelli, supra
note 2, at 1204-05.
5. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (1923) (concluding that the results of
a polygraph examination were not generally accepted, and thus not admissible).
See also People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969);
People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Kings County Ct. 1938); People v.
Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938). One effect of the
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SiS,6 neutron activation analysis,7 hypnosis,8 DNA fingerprint-
ing tests,9 drug influence tests,10 electrophoresis," rape trauma
syndrome, 12 acute grief syndrome,' 3 psychological factors re-
garding witness perception and memory, 14 and other scientific
techniques.15
Although the Frye standard has been traditionally applied
by the majority of federal' 6 and state 7 courts, the test has been
criticized by academic commentators, 18 and courts on both the
holding in Frye is that polygraph evidence is now generally rejected by the major-
ity of courts. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
6. See United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974); People v. Kelly,
549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976); People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365
(Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Bronx County 1978); People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385
N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Bronx County 1976).
7. United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
994 (1971); State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Mo. 1972); State v. Coolidge, 260
A.2d 547 (N.H. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
8. See State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266 (Ariz. 1982); Peo-
ple v. Shirley, 723 P.2d 1354 (Cal.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 860 (1982); State v.
Hurd, 432 A.2d 86 (N.J. 1981); People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 1077,
557 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1990); People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466
N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
9. See People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97
(1994); People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Crim T.
Bronx County 1989).
10. People v. Quinn, 153 Misc. 2d 139, 580 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk
County 1991).
11. Electrophoresis is the testing of blood for genetic markers, which can be
used to exclude or include suspects or decedents. See People v. Seda, 139 Misc. 2d
834, 529 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988).
12. See People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883
(1990); Gutierrez v. Iulo, 156 Misc. 2d 79, 591 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1992).
13. People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1992).
14. People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115
(1990) (per curiam) (Kaye, J., dissenting).
15. See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5, at 11-13;
Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1205-06.
16. See United States v. St. Pierre, 812 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1987); United States
v. Tranowski, 659 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Hendershot, 614 F.2d
648 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 991
(1971).
17. See infra note 82 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 44-60 and accompanying text. See also Gianneli, supra
note 2, at 1250; JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 363-64 (4th
ed. 1992); 3 JACK A. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE I
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federal and state level have either modified the standard 19 or
have rejected it completely. 20
New York trial courts adopted the Frye test with little dis-
cussion, 21 and the New York Court of Appeals formally em-
braced the standard fifteen years after Frye.22 In 1993, the
United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,23 which held that the Frye test was super-
seded by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and that a relevancy
standard applied instead.24 The New York Court of Appeals re-
cently declined to follow Daubert, and again affirmed the Frye
test as the applicable standard in New York. 25
This Comment will argue that the Frye standard as devel-
oped in New York case law contains serious flaws, and that the
standard outlined in Daubert26 offers a more flexible approach
based on the relevance and reliability of novel scientific evi-
dence.27 Despite the New York Court of Appeals's refusal to fol-
702[03], at 702-35 (1988). See generally GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2,
§ 1-5(E), at 25-28, for an extensive list of critics of the standard.
19. As Giannelli notes, the test has been applied in several different ways.
Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1228. Some courts have applied Frye strictly. See, e.g.,
United State v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Other courts have applied
Frye by limiting the field of experts to those who have familiarity with the particu-
lar technique at issue. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 331 P.2d 251 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. 1958). Still other courts have applied the holding in Williams in differ-
ing ways. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 n.6 (Mass. 1975) (as-
signing greater weight to those experts who had "direct and empirical experience"
in voice spectrographs than those wlio had a theoretical knowledge of the test).
These differing applications of Frye have lead Giannelli to conclude that there are
"several Frye tests, not one." Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1228. These differing ver-
sions of the test manifest how the ambiguity of the standard leads to inconsistent
applications and inconsistent results. See discussion infra part IV.A.
20. State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1384
(1981); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Dorsey, 539 P.2d 204
(N.M. 1975).
21. See generally People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Kings County
Ct. 1938); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct.
1938).
22. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
23. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
24. Id. at 2794-95.
25. People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 423, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454, 611 N.Y.S.2d
97, 100 (1994).
26. 113 S.Ct. at 2796.
27. See discussion infra part IV.B.
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low the Daubert approach, 28 such a relevancy approach would
solve many of these flaws. Part I of this Comment examines
Frye and the use of the standard in federal courts, along with an
outline of the major criticisms of, and competing rationales for,
continued use of the test. Part II outlines a history of the use of
the Frye standard in New York state courts. Part III analyzes
the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert. Part IV analyzes
Daubert's impact on New York and conclude that many of the
problems confronted and never fully resolved by New York
courts may be better resolved by the flexible standard outlined
in Daubert.
II. Background
A. Frye v. United States
James Alphonso Frye was accused of second degree mur-
der.2 During trial Frye offered the testimony of an expert on
the results of a deception test o taken by the defendant.31 The
court sustained the prosecution's objection and precluded the
evidence from being admitted.32 Frye was subsequently
convicted*3
On appeal, the sole question for the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia was whether the proffered evidence
should have been admitted.3 4 The court acknowledged that de-
termining the admissibility of deception test results was an is-
sue of first impression in the courts. 3 5 The court framed its
analysis with the common law rule that "[w]hen [a] question
involved does not lie within the range of common experience or
28. See Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 423 n.2, 633 N.E.2d at 454 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d at
100 n.2.
29. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
30. The deception test was an early form of the lie detector test which mea-
sured changes in blood pressure. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1204 n.41. Decep-
tion is supposedly marked by a rise in the blood pressure "in a curve, which
corresponds exactly to the struggle going on in the subject's mind...." Frye, 293
F. at 1013. Appellate courts in New York first used Frye as precedent in consider-
ing whether similar deception tests should be admitted as evidence. See People v.
Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
31. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
32. Id. at 1014.
33. Id. at 1013.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1014.
542 [Vol. 15:539
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol15/iss2/5
1995] ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
common knowledge, but requires special experience or special
knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that partic-
ular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are ad-
missible in evidence." 36
The court then outlined the standard to be satisfied before
such scientific evidence is to be admitted:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line be-
tween the experimental and the demonstrable stages is difficult to
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the
principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way
in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized sci-
entific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction
is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.37
Concluding that the systolic blood pressure deception test had
not yet been generally accepted by the scientific community, the
court affirmed the conviction. 38
The approach in Frye relies on certain assumptions about
the relationship of science to law. First, the general acceptance
requirement in Frye attempts to distinguish between the exper-
imental phase of a new scientific technique, where it would face
heightened scientific scrutiny, and the demonstrable phase,
where it would have obtained general scientific acceptance. 39
Under this rationale, admissibility of novel scientific evidence is
not solely dependent on its relevance to a material issue in the
case. 4° As pointed out, Frye applies a stricter standard:41 the
test requires that any novel scientific evidence must be gener-
ally accepted in the scientific community to be admitted. 42 This
standard reflects the court's fear that unreliable scientific evi-
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. It is interesting to note that, although the court in Frye concluded that
the test was not generally accepted in the scientific community, the case is devoid
of any discussion of scientific literature establishing the lack of such scientific ac-
ceptance. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
39. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1205.
40. See infra part II.C for a discussion of the relevancy standard used in some
federal courts.
41. 293 F. at 1014.
42. GIANNELLI & IMWINKELIUED, supra note 2, § 1-5, at 10; Giannelli, supra
note 2, at 1205.
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dence, if admitted, would improperly affect the outcome of the
trial.43
B. Criticism of the Frye Standard
Criticism of the Frye standard by courts and commentators
has grown markedly over the years as new scientific techniques
have continually tested the viability of the standard." The crit-
icisms of the test have focused on four general areas. First,
courts and commentators have found Frye to unnecessarily re-
strict the admissibility of reliable evidence.4 5 Instead of admit-
ting evidence strictly on the basis of its reliability for a material
issue at trial, the Frye standard also requires that the test or
theory be generally accepted by the scientific community.46
This can lead to evidence which, though relevant, may not be
admitted for jury consideration.4 7 One reason for this conserva-
tive approach is the test's own assumption that once a theory or
technique is generally accepted by the scientific community, it
is proven to be reliable in the context of a legal dispute.48
43. See supra text accompanying note 37.
44. See generally Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1208-23 for a discussion of at-
tacks on the Frye tests, as well as factors which may have sparked a critical reex-
amination of the test.
45. United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Under
Frye ... courts may be required to exclude such probative and reliable information
from the jury's consideration, thereby unnecessarily impeding the truth-seeking
function of litigation."); United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (discussing that the standard "precludes too much relevant evidence"); GL4-
NELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(E), at 27; Paul C. Gianneli, Frye v.
United States, 99 F.R.D. 189, 192 (1983) (stating that "the heavy burden de-
manded by the Frye test deprives courts of relevant evidence").
46. See United States v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
47. See supra note 45 and authorities cited therein. Some courts have ac-
knowledged the conservative nature of the test, and consider it a key advantage.
See, e.g., United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The "pri-
mary advantage ... of the Frye test lies in its essentially conservative nature."
G1ANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(E), at 27 (quoting People v. Kelly,
549 P.2d 1240, 1245 (Cal. 1976)). But see infra text accompanying notes 244-45.
48. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1205 (stating that "[a] novel technique
must pass through an 'experimental stage in which it is scrutinized by the scien-
tific community. Only after the technique has been tested successfully in this
stage and has passed into the 'demonstrable' stage will it receive judicial recogni-
tion."); GLANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(E), at 27 (noting that "[a]
literal reading of Frye v. United States would require that the courts always await
the passing of a 'cultural lag' during which period the new method will have had
sufficient time to diffuse through scientific discipline and create the requisite body
544
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The second criticism of courts49 and commentators50 is that
the test is ambiguous as to whether "scientific community"
means only those who use the technique, or if it includes other
related fields. The amorphous definition of "scientific commu-
nity" contributes to the possibility that a scientific test may be
admissible in one court, but rejected in another. If a court con-
cludes that the scientific community includes scientists in re-
lated fields, the usual result is that such evidence is deemed
inadmissible, either because the number of experts is not
enough to constitute "general acceptance"51 or because the
scientists in related fields have expressed doubts as to the test's
reliability.52 Thus, the construction of a "scientific community"
by the court can influence the probability of the evidence being
admitted.53
of scientific opinion needed for acceptability") (quoting Constantine J. Maletskos &
Stephen J. Spielman, Introduction of New Scientific Methods in Court, in LAw EN-
FORCEMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 957, 958 (S.A. Yetsky ed., 1967)). This as-
sumption thus blocks out new forms of evidence which might be reliable, but which
have not had enough time to generate the volume of writings needed to demon-
strate "general acceptance." See supra text accompanying notes 39-43.
49. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978) ("A de-
termination of reliability cannot rest solely on a process of 'counting (scientific)
noses.'... Selection of the 'relevant scientific community,' appears to influence the
result."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
Courts have recognized this inherent ambiguity. In People v. Collins, 94 Misc.
2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Bronx County 1978), the court, in
discussing the admissibility of voice spectrography, discussed whether the scien-
tific community under Frye included "those scientists who actually employ the
spectrograph for voice identification, or whether the field should be widened to in-
clude those scientists who use the spectrograph for other purposes in connection
with the human voice." Id. at 708, 404 N.Y.S.2d at 368. See also People v. Leone,
25 N.Y.2d 511, 516, 255 N.E.2d 696, 699, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430, 433 (1969) (observing
that "proponents of the machine... believe that lying causes measurable physical
reactions which the polygraph can record," whereas "opponents of the polygraph
are equally strong in their belief that a lie detector is unreliable").
50. Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1208 ("Many scientific techniques do not fall
within the domain of a single academic discipline or professional field."); John W.
Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 1970 U. ILL.
L.F. 1, 12.
51. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d at 516, 255 N.E.2d at 699, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 433 (noting
that "the use of the polygraph touches areas in medicine, psychology, and sociol-
ogy; yet most examiners have no training in those sciences"); Collins, 94 Misc. 2d
at 707-10, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 367-69 (holding that reliance only on "personal opin-
ions" does not "bespeak general scientific acceptance").
52. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d at 710, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
53. Some commentators have proposed that the inherent ambiguity of "scien-
tific acceptance" allows courts to manipulate the standard, and thus admit or ex-
7
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A third criticism is that it is unclear if "general acceptance"
means a simple majority of experts, a higher percentage, or
near universal acceptance. 54 Thus, the conclusion a court draws
as to what constitutes "general acceptance" can also affect ad-
missibility, since a strict standard requiring a high percentage
is more difficult to satisfy than a standard requiring a simple
majority. 55
A fourth area of criticism is that it is unclear whether the
standard should be applied to "soft"56 scientific evidence, such
as psychiatric or psychological profiles, in the same way as
"hard"57 scientific theories and techniques.58 The technique in
Frye was a primitive form of the lie detector test, and the court
did not suggest that the test be used to determine the admissi-
bility of psychiatric or psychological evidence at trial.59 Many
commentators have discussed this problem.60
clude novel scientific evidence. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-
5(E), at 25 ("One criticism is that the general acceptance test is applied selec-
tively."); Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1219 ("[T]he selective application of the gen-
eral acceptance standard is one of its most notable features-inconsistencies in
application abound.").
54. See People v. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581
(1981); People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 484 N.Y.S.2d 577 (2d Dep't 1984).
55. In Middleton, the Court of Appeals declared that general acceptance is not
determined by "whether a particular procedure is unanimously indorsed by the
scientific community, but whether it is generally acceptable as reliable." 54 N.Y.2d
at 49, 429 N.E.2d at 103, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 584. In its opinion, the court suggested
that a simple majority constituted general acceptance of the technique. Id. But see
infra note 222. The ambiguity of"general acceptance" is also the basis for selective
application of the standard. See generally discussion infra part IV.A.
56. "Soft" is defined as "being or based on interpretative or speculative data"
and "utilized or based on soft data." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTION-
ARY 1120 (9th ed. 1985).
57. "Hard" is defined as "being, schooled in, or using the methods of one or
more branches of mathematics, the life sciences, or the physical sciences." WEB-
STER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 552 (9th ed. 1985).
58. The problems surrounding the use of the Frye standard to determine the
admissibility of psychiatric evidence are manifold. The Frye test was devised to
ensure reliability of the scientific technique. But psychiatric profiles, attained pri-
marily through the use of clinical interviews, are difficult to quantify. If conclud-
ing that the standard applies to "soft" scientific evidence, its failure to be
quantified may reduce its chances of admissibility. People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d
681, 688-90, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972, 976-78 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1992).
59. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
60. See, e.g., 22 CHARLES WRIGHT & KENNETH GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5168, at 87 n.10 (1978) ("What is 'scientific evidence' to which
the test applies? When a witness testifies that he saw the defendant throw a rock
546
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As criticism of the standard has grown, proponents have ar-
ticulated several rationales in defense of the Frye test. First,
the general acceptance standard guarantees a reserve of ex-
perts who can testify as to the reliability or validity of such evi-
dence. 61 Second, the Frye test in theory promotes a uniformity
of decisions, since courts will look to the same scientific materi-
als and legal opinions to determine the admissibility of such evi-
dence.62 Third, the standard also eliminates the possibility that
the validity or reliability of a novel technique will become the
central issue at trial.63 But the principal justification for the
test is that it establishes a method to help ensure the reliability
of scientific evidence, and to preclude the admissibility of unre-
liable evidence.6 4 The conflict over the continued viability of the
test escalated with the passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. 65
C. Use of Frye in Federal Courts
After Frye was decided, most federal and state courts ini-
tially subscribed to the Frye standard in determining whether
at the victim, the inferences to be drawn from this testimony involve a number of
principles of physics, but few courts would apply the Frye test."); GIANNELLI & IM-
WINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(E), at 25 (citing WRIGHT & GRAHM, supra, at 87
n.10).
61. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[Tlhe Frye
test protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve of
experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination
in a particular case."); see generally GLANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-
5(A), at 15.
62. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(A), at 15. A point of
criticism growing out of this rationale is that some courts rely primarily on other
court decisions admitting the evidence to determine admissibility in its own court-
room. "This use of prior judicial decisions undercuts the primary rationale sup-
porting Frye-that those most qualified to judge the validity of a technique should
have the determinative voice." Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1218-19. See also Peo-
ple v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Kings County
1976).
63. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(A), at 15.
64. Id.; Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1207 (The test "establishes a method for
ensuring the reliability of scientific evidence."). Proponents argue that scientists
are in the most knowledgeable position to judge whether a scientific technique is
sufficiently reliable. See Addison, 498 F.2d at 743-44 ("The requirement of general
acceptance in the scientific community assures that those most qualified to assess
the general validity of a scientific method will have the determinative voice.").
65. See infra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
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novel scientific evidence should be admitted. 66 Upon approval
of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975,67 circuits disagreed as
to whether the Rules incorporated the Frye standard. The Frye
standard was not explicitly codified in the rules covering the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence, 68 nor was reference made to
the standard in the comments, Advisory Committee's Notes, or
hearings on the Federal Rules. 69 Some courts, noting that the
Rules did not explicitly overrule the standard, continued to ap-
ply the test.70
Other courts, looking instead to the lack of an explicit adop-
tion of the test in the Rules or the comments, reason that the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye test,71 and that
admissibility should be determined by applying Rules 702,72
703,73 and 403.74 The novelty of a particular scientific technique
66. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1204.
67. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. app. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
68. See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of Federal
Rules of Evidence §§ 702, 703, and 403.
69. See GIANNELLI & IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, § 1-5(F), at 28-29.
70. See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992); United States v.
Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348,
351 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 441 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994
(1971); United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 893, 895 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd on
other grounds, 563 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000 (1978).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985);
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117
(1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019
(1975).
72. Rule 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R.
EVID. 702. This rule has liberalized the standard for admissibility, and has argua-
bly left the question of reliability to the judge and the weight of such evidence to
the jury. See GIANNELLI AND IMWINKELRIED, supra note 2, at 28-31. So long as
reliable and relevant, expert testimony may be admitted. Id.
73. Rule 703 provides:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opin-
ion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at
or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts
or data need not be admissible in evidence.
548
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goes to the weight of the evidence,75 and the Federal Rules of
Evidence require a more liberal approach to admissibility. 76
Scientific evidence, like any other type of relevant 77 evidence,
should thus be admitted if its probative value is not substan-
tially outweighed by unfair prejudice.78
Unlike most states, New York has not adopted a code of
evidence modeled after the Federal example.7 9 The Frye stan-
dard was judicially adopted by the Court of Appeals in 1938,80
and continues to be used as the standard for admissibility.81 A
detailed discussion of the standard as used in New York will
follow.
D. The Frye Standard in New York
The application of the Frye test in New York, like in most
other states,8 2 has exhibited problems with the standard, as
FED. R. EVID. 703.
74. Rule 403 states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its pro-
bative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading of the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." FED. R. EVID. 403.
75. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
76. Id. ("[Tihe established considerations applicable to the admissibility of ev-
idence come into play."). See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d
Cir. 1985) ("The language of Fed. R. Evid. 702, the spirit of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in general, and the experience with the Frye test suggest the appropri-
ateness of a more flexible approach to the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence.").
77. In Williams, for example, the court suggested that the main issues regard-
ing admissibility of novel scientific evidence are the test's reliability and its ten-
dency to mislead the jury. Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198-1200.
78. See FED. R. EVID. 403; Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198 (stating that "the proba-
tiveness, materiality, and reliability of the evidence, on the one side, and any ten-
dency to mislead, prejudice, or confuse the jury on the other, must be the focal
points of inquiry").
79. See infra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
80. People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), reh'g denied, 279 N.Y.
788, 18 N.E.2d 870 (1939).
81. People v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1994).
82. After the Frye decision, the majority of state courts adopted the standard
for use in determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Rivers v.
Black, 68 So. 2d 2 (Ala. 1953); State ex rel. Collins v. Superior Court, 644 P.2d 1266
(Ariz. 1982); People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240 (Cal. 1976); People v. Milone, 356
N.E.2d 1350 (111. 1976); State v. Washington, 622 P.2d 986 (Kan. 1981); Reed v.
State, 391 A.2d 364 (Md. 1978); People v. Barbara, 255 N.W.2d 171 (Mich. 1977);
State v. Stout, 478 S.W.2d 368 (Mo. 1972); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct.
11
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well as reasons for its continued use. 83 The test has been modi-
fied by case law to address some of the criticisms associated
with application of the test,8 4 but these modifications may have
led to other problems and misapplications with the test.85 Also,
some flaws in the test still have gone unaddressed, and these
flaws have led to a sometimes unclear and inconsistent applica-
tion of the test.86
1. Acceptance of the Standard
New York trial courts did not discuss the test's efficacy
upon adoption.87 The first trial court adopting the standard
with little discussion was Beuschel v. Manowitz.88 The plaintiff
in Beuschel brought an action for damages against defendant
for a "carnal assault" which allegedly caused plaintiff to bear a
child.89 The defendant moved for an order to have the plaintiff
and child submit to a Landsteiner blood-grouping test to help
resolve the issue of paternity. 90 The court required the plaintiff
App. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 910 (1981); State v. Palmer, 313 N.W.2d 648
(Neb. 1981); State v. Coolidge, 260 A.2d 547 (N.H. 1969), rev'd on other grounds,
403 U.S. 443 (1971); State v. Sinnott, 132 A.2d 298 (N.J. 1957); Montoya v. Metro-
politan Court, 651 P.2d 1260 (N.M. 1982); State v. Smith, 362 N.E.2d 1239 (Ohio
1976); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
898 (1951); Commonwealth v. Topa, 369 A.2d 1277 (Pa. 1977); State v. Helmer,
278 N.W.2d 808 (S.D. 1979).
Other courts have ultimately rejected the standard. See Whalen v. State, 434
A.2d 1346 (Del. 1980), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); Harper v. State, 292
S.E.2d 389 (Ga. 1982); State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 927 (1981); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); State v. Brown, 687
P.2d 751 (Or. 1984).
Another complication is that the majority of states have adopted codes of evi-
dence modeled after the Federal Rules. See generally Giannelli, supra note 2, at
1228-29. The decision in Daubert, discussed infra part III, has convinced some
states that have not already done so to now officially abandon the Frye standard.
See, e.g., State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994); Wilt v. Buracker, 443
S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2137 (1994).
83. See supra part II.B for a discussion on the criticism of, and supporting
rationale for, the Frye test.
84. See supra part II.D.2.
85. See discussion infra part IV.A.
86. See discussion infra part IV.A.
87. See People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Kings County Ct.
1938).
88. 151 Misc. 899, 271 N.Y.S. 277 (Sup. Ct. Kings County), rev'd, 241 A.D.
888, 272 N.Y.S. 165 (1934).
89. Id. at 899, 271 N.Y.S. at 278.
90. Id. at 899, 900, 271 N.Y.S. at 278.
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to submit to the blood test.91 Referring to Frye, the court ex-
plained: "Naturally, the courts will not permit the application of
scientific tests which have not attained definite and dependable
results accepted generally by those qualified to judge."92 Re-
viewing the "pamphlets" submitted to the court, the court con-
cluded that such evidence was generally accepted so as to be
admissible.93 After analyzing several cases which have turned
on the admissibility of scientific evidence, the court stated its
openness to new techniques and willingness to look forward re-
garding the use of such evidence. 94 Other early cases demon-
strate this same trend.95
91. Id. at 903, 271 N.Y.S. at 281.
92. Id. at 901, 271 N.Y.S. at 280. The court accurately articulated the line
drawn between science and law, and the relationship between them:
Law and jurisprudence, which are something more than the dry tomes of the
past, can be understood by considering fundamental principles not only of
government and economics but also at times by giving consideration in par-
ticular cases to sociology, medicine, or other sciences, philosophy and his-
tory. New concepts must beat down the crystallized resistance of the legally
trained mind that always seeks precedent before the new is accepted into
law. Frequently we must look ahead and not backwards.
Id. at 900, 271 N.Y.S. at 278.
93. Id. at 902, 271 N.Y.S. at 281. "The same arguments which might be ad-
vanced against the test here sought have, from time immemorial, been urged
whenever a step has been taken which marked progress; but the law is not static."
Id. at 901-02, 271 N.Y.S. at 280.
94. Id. at 901, 271 N.Y.S. at 279-80.
95. See, e.g., People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913 (Kings County Ct.
1938); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens County Ct. 1938).
However, these two cases demonstrate how adoption of the Frye test by trial courts
has sometimes led to inconsistent applications. For example, in Kenny the results
of a lie detector test of defendant were deemed admissible by the court. The test
was applied by one Father Summers, who had tested the device on over 6000 indi-
viduals, with results approaching 100% accuracy. Kenny, 167 Misc. at 51-52, 3
N.Y.S.2d at 349-50. Frye was cited as precedent against admitting such evidence.
Id. at 53, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 350. The court held that, since other forms of scientific
evidence, such as handwriting experts and psychiatrists, gave rise to differing con-
clusions but were still usually admitted, the lie detector results should be admitted
for consideration by the jury. Id. at 54, 3 N.Y.S.2d at 351. Thus, the basis of the
decision relied less on the device's general acceptance by the scientific community,
and focused on its relevance to the issue of defendant's guilt. In Forte, the court,
again in determining the admissibility of the results of a lie detector test, ignored
Kenny as persuasive authority and instead conducted a survey of publications of
the field. Forte, 167 Misc. at 869, 4 N.Y.S.2d at 916. The court concluded that,
even if the test were administered by Father Summers, the test would still not
have attained the general acceptance needed for admissibility. Id. at 874, 4
N.Y.S.2d at 919.
13
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The Frye standard was formally adopted by the New York
Court of Appeals in 1938, but also without illustrative discus-
sion. In People v. Forte,96 defendant Vincent Forte was con-
victed of first-degree murder of a store owner.97 The conviction
was based primarily on eyewitness testimony of the events lead-
ing up to the crime and a ballistics analysis of the defendant's
gun.98 The defense moved to reopen the case and submit the
defendant to a lie detector test.99 The motion was denied.100
The defendant was convicted, and he subsequently appealed.101
Upon review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. 0 2
After noting that the defendant raised an issue of law "which
require[d] serious consideration,"1 3 the court devoted only one
paragraph to discussing the standard.10 4 It concluded: "[tihe
record [was] devoid of evidence tending to show a general scien-
tific recognition that the pathometer possesses efficacy." 0 5 Fur-
ther, absent reasonable certainty "demonstrated by qualified
experts in respect to the lie 'detector,'" the court would not
"hold as [a] matter of law that error was committed in refusing
to allow defendant to experiment with it."1o6 Thus, the court
formally adopted the Frye standard as the standard to apply in
New York, albeit without extensive discussion. The decision
may also have shaped how the test was to be applied.107
The inconsistency of application may be explained in several ways. One argu-
ment may be the inherently ambiguous terms of the test, which allowed for differ-
ing interpretations. See infra text accompanying notes 221-27. Another related
argument is that the test was vague enough to fulfill the wishes of the judge. The
tenor of the opinions in Beuschel and Kenny suggests that they were pro-admissi-
bility; the tenor of the opinion in Forte, in contrast, suggests a more cautious
approach.
96. 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938), reh'g denied, 279 N.Y. 788, 18 N.E.2d
870 (1939).
97. Id. at 205, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
98. Id. at 205-06, 18'N.E.2d at 32.
99. Id. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 205-06, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
102. Id. at 207, 18 N.E.2d at 33.




107. A reference in the decision may have been aimed to prevent the kind of
analysis found in Kenny in admitting scientific evidence. See supra note 95. In a
retort to the court's claim in Kenny that handwriting analysis and psychiatric tes-
552
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2. Discussion and Modification of Frye
It has only been in the last twenty-five years that New York
courts have engaged in a thorough discussion of the Frye stan-
dard. The sudden outburst of discussion has arguably been
sparked by new scientific techniques which have tested the via-
bility of the standard. 08 These applications have also revealed
weaknesses or ambiguities in the original standard, which have
prompted some modifications.
One of the first Frye modifications by the Court of Appeals
was an attempt to explain what constitutes general acceptance
under the Frye test. In People v. Leone, 109 the Court of Appeals
defined the general acceptance standard as whether the tech-
nique "has been sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance" in the applicable scientific community."10
In Leone, three persons were murdered at a rest area."'
The defendant was questioned several times in connection with
the murders, and was then asked to take a polygraph test,"12 to
which he consented."l 3 He was ultimately charged with the
murders two years later. 1 4 Before trial, the prosecution ad-
timony which can give rise to differing conclusions are admitted, the Court of Ap-
peals wrote that "[elvidence relating to handwriting... is recognized by experts as
possessing such value that reasonable certainty can follow from tests." Forte, 279
N.Y. at 206, 18 N.E.2d at 32.
108. The vast majority of Frye applications in its early history revolved
around the lie detector test. See, e.g., People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d
696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969); People v. Forte, 167 Misc. 868, 4 N.Y.S.2d 913
(Kings County Ct. 1938); People v. Kenny, 167 Misc. 51, 3 N.Y.S.2d 348 (Queens
County Ct. 1938). With an increase in the use of novel and groundbreaking scien-
tific techniques, the standard is now applied to techniques impossible to predict
during the time of the Frye holding. See generally supra notes 6-15 and accompa-
nying text. For example, DNA fingerprinting as evidence at trials has not only
prompted a modification of the standard, but at least one trial court modified the
standard to make it more conservative than the Frye test. See, e.g., People v. Cas-
tro, 144 Misc. 2d 956; 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Bronx County 1989).
109. 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1969).
110. Id. at 517, 255 N.E.2d at 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 434.
111. Id. at 512, 255 N.E.2d at 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
112. Id. at 512, 255 N.E.2d at 697, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 430. The lie detector in
Leone was significantly more advanced than the one in Frye and other early cases.
The test here not only measured blood pressure like the early detectors, but also a
subject's respiration, heart rate, and the skin's resistance to electric current. Id. at
513, 255 N.E.2d at 697, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
113. Id. at 512, 255 N.E.2d at 697, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
114. Id. at 513, 255 N.E.2d at 697, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 431.
15
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vised the defendant that it planned to introduce the results of
the test as evidence. 115 Defendant moved to suppress the evi-
dence, and the motion was granted. 116 The Appellate Division,
Fourth Department, affirmed without opinion. 117 The prosecu-
tion then appealed to the Court of Appeals.""
The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the Appellate
Division.119 The court surveyed the scientific literature on the
test, and found enough disagreement as to its general accept-
ance to affirm the order.120 In its attempt to formulate what
constitutes "general acceptance," the court explained:
Although perfection in test results is not a prerequisite to the ad-
missibility of evidence obtainable by the use of scientific instru-
ments, the rule has been to grant judicial recognition only after
the instrument has been sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs. 121
The court also considered "scientific community" to include
those experts in fields related to the technique under
consideration. 122
At least one subsequent decision has interpreted Leone as
establishing that a percentage of experts of less than one hun-
dred percent would satisfy the general acceptance standard. 123
The court's holding has also been interpreted to suggest that
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. People v. Leone, 31 A.D.2d 1009, 300 N.Y.S.2d 308 (4th Dep't 1969).
118. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d at 512, 255 N.E.2d at 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
119. Id. at 518, 255 N.E.2d at 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 435.
120. Id. at 514-16, 255 N.E.2d at 698-99, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 432-34. The deci-
sion can be interpreted as establishing a conservative approach to the admissibil-
ity of novel scientific evidence. The Leone court voiced concern over the effect such
evidence may have in the minds of a jury. Id. at 518, 255 N.E.2d at 700, 307
N.Y.S.2d at 435. "We are all aware of the tremendous weight which such tests
would necessarily have in the minds of a jury. Thus, we should be most careful in
admitting into evidence the results of such tests unless their reasonable accuracy
and general scientific acceptance are clearly recognized." Id.
121. Id. at 517, 255 N.E.2d at 700, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 434 (citing 3 JOHN H.
WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 990 (3d ed. 1940)).
122. Id. at 516, 255 N.E.2d at 699, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 433.
123. See People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 708, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 368 (Sup.
Ct. Crim. T. Kings County 1978).
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another separate test for the theory or technique's reliability
must be satisfied before the evidence may be admitted.124
The interpretation of Leone requiring satisfaction of both
general acceptance and reliability was corrected in People v.
Middleton. 25 In Middleton, the defendant, a hospital mainte-
nance employee, was arraigned on charges related to the death
of his supervisor, who was found in his office with five distinct
bite marks on his back. 126 Before presentation to the grand
jury, the prosecution filed a motion requiring the defendant to
submit to an oral examination and the making of a cast of his
mouth by an expert. 127 Over defense's objections, 128 the court
124. Id. at 706, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The court in Collins interpreted Leone as
mandating two separate tests which must be satisfied before novel scientific evi-
dence is to be admitted: its general acceptance in the scientific community, and a
separate judicial evaluation of the technique or theory's reliability. Id. at 706-07,
405 N.Y.S.2d at 367. Specifically, the court stated that "the standard which must
be applied to the admissibility of... any scientific test, is the twofold test of relia-
bility and general scientific acceptance." Id. at 706, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The
court in Collins relied primarily on the last passage of the Leone opinion: "We are
all aware of the tremendous weight which such tests would necessarily have in the
minds of a jury. Thus, we should be most careful in admitting into evidence the
results of such tests unless their reasonable accuracy and general scientific accept-
ance are clearly recognized." Id. (citing Leone, 25 N.Y.2d at 518, 255 N.E.2d at
700, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 435 (emphasis added)). But other opinions have rejected the
twofold test on the grounds that the general acceptance standard was designed
primarily to ensure the technique's reliability by those most able to judge. See,
e.g., People v. Burton, 153 Misc. 2d 681, 590 N.Y.S.2d 972 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1992). In Burton, the court concluded that the Frye standard "predicates the ad-
missibility of scientific evidence on the assumption that 'general acceptance' in the
scientific community is indicative of reliability to allow an opinion of evidential
force to be asserted in the courtroom." 153 Misc. 2d at 684, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 974. A
close reading of the Leone decision suggests that the court wanted both scientific
and judicial assurances of reliability, which raises an important question as to
whether a court's determination of reliability of a scientific technique or theory
defeats the purpose of the Frye standard. See Collins, 94 Misc. 2d at 706-07, 405
N.Y.S.2d at 367.
The interpretation that determining general acceptance also presumes a tech-
nique's reliability is established in People v. Middleton. See infra notes 125-39 and
accompanying text.
125. 54 N.Y.2d 42, 429 N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981).
126. Id. at 45, 429 N.E.2d at 101, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
127. Id.
128. "Defendant's attorney opposed [the] motion on the grounds that the
Supreme Court was without jurisdiction, that the People had failed to establish
probable cause to believe defendant had committed the crime, and that such exam-
ination and casting would violate defendant's Fifth Amendment rights." Id.
17
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granted the prosecution's motion. 129 Based on the bite mark ev-
idence and other evidence, defendant was indicted by the grand
jury130 and subsequently convicted of first degree manslaugh-
ter.13 The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the
trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. 32 The
defendant then appealed to the Court of Appeals. 33
The Court of Appeals held that "[t]he reliability of bite
mark evidence as a means of identification is sufficiently estab-
lished in the scientific community to make such evidence admis-
sible in a criminal case, without separately establishing
scientific reliability in each case.. . ."1 Rather than develop a
separate test for reliability, the Court of Appeals reasoned that
such reliability could be demonstrated by the "authenticity of
the materials used and propriety of the procedure followed"135
at trial, which would then be subject to cross-examination.136
The court, following its prior holding in Leone, stated that gen-
eral acceptance of a procedure does not require unanimous en-
dorsement, but rather that it be "generally acceptable as
reliable."'3 7
The holding in Middleton established that only the Frye
test would be used in determining the admissibility of novel sci-
entific evidence, without a separate determination by the court
of its reliability, so long as the proper foundation of evidence
was established. 3 8 The court also suggested that the jury is the
proper body to determine the weight of such evidence. 3 9
129. Id.
130. Id. at 45-46, 429 N.E.2d at 101, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
131. Id. at 46, 429 N.E.2d at 102, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
132. People v. Middleton, 76 A.D.2d 762, 763,428 N.Y.S.2d 688, 689 (1st Dep't
1980).
133. Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d at 46-47, 429 N.E.2d at 102, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 583.
134. Id. at 45, 429 N.E.2d at 101, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 582.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 49, 429 N.E.2d at 103, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 584.
138. Id. at 49-51, 429 N.E.2d at 103-04, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85.
139. Id. at 51, 429 N.E.2d at 104, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 585. In Leone, the Court of
Appeals seemed mindful of the "tremendous weight" scientific evidence would have
in the minds of a jury. See supra note 120. But in Middleton, the second test of
reliability was dismissed due to the court's belief that the adversarial process
would aid the jury in determining the weight of the evidence. Middleton, 54
N.Y.2d at 51, 429 N.E.2d at 104, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 585.
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3. Current Crises
In the past twelve years, the Court of Appeals has heard
many cases regarding the Frye standard, including four cases
since 1990.140 One central concern of the court has been the ad-
missibility of hypnotically produced recall at trial.
In People v. Hughes,14' a victim was raped outside of her
home. 142 Unable to remember who raped her, she consented to
a number of hypnotic sessions to help her recall the event.143
Before her first session, she learned that the police suspected
the defendant.144 In the first session, she identified the defend-
ant as her attacker. 145 Prior to trial, defendant moved to sup-
press victim's testimony on grounds that she was unable to
identify the attacker at the hospital immediately after the rape,
and that hypnosis was unduly suggestive.146 The trial court ad-
mitted the hypnotic testimony as evidence, 147 and defendant
was found guilty at trial of rape, assault, and burglary.148 On
appeal, the Appellate Division reversed. 149
Upon review, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate
Division, holding that hypnotically produced recall was inad-
missible as verification of the witness's testimony because it
had not been generally accepted as reliable in the scientific com-
munity. 150 Deciding that the Frye standard was applicable to
hypnosis, it held:
[W]hen presented with scientific evidence purporting to gauge the
credibility of participants or witnesses to a criminal incident, we
140. People v. Schreiner, 77 N.Y.2d 733, 573 N.E.2d 552, 570 N.Y.S.2d 464
(1991) (hypnotically induced recall); People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d
1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990) (psychological factors affecting an eyewitness's tes-
timony); People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 1077, 557 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1990)
(hypnotically produced recall); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131,
552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990) (rape trauma syndrome).
141. 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1983).
142. Id. at 526-27, 453 N.E.2d at 485, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
143. Id. at 529, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
144. Id. at 529-30, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
145. Id. at 530, 453 N.E.2d at 486, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 257.
146. Id. at 527, 453 N.E.2d at 485, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 256.
147. Id. at 531-32, 453 N.E.2d at 487, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 258.
148. Id. at 532, 453 N.E.2d at 488, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
149. People v. Hughes, 88 A.D.2d 17, 452 N.Y.S.2d 929 (4th Dep't 1982). The
appellate division reversed on the grounds that hypnosis as evidence did not sat-
isfy the Frye standard. Id. at 20, 21, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 931, 932.
150. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 543, 453 N.E.2d at 494, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 265.
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have established a very high level of reliability, tantamount to
certainty, as a predicate for its admissibility. Although ordinary
scientific proof need not meet such a demanding standard, the in-
creased certitude has been found appropriate when the fallibility
of the scientific procedure might directly affect the fact finder's
assessment of eyewitness credibility.151
Hughes is significant because the court concluded that the
Frye standard applied to cases of hypnosis, and thus such evi-
dence was inadmissible. 152 This presumption has been ques-
tioned,153 and foreshadowed future concerns with what kinds of
techniques require application of the Frye test, 54 including
other forms of testimony enhanced through hypnosis. 155 The
court also concluded that the Frye test applied, even though its
application in other jurisdictions led to inconsistent results. 56
151. Id. at 542, 453 N.E.2d at 493, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 264 (citations omitted).
152. The court based its conclusion on a general survey of case law. Id. at
537, 453 N.E.2d at 490-91, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
153. At the Appellate Division, a concern was raised as to whether the Frye
standard applied. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Doerr stated: "I have some
doubts as to whether [the Frye] rule should apply, since the evidence being
presented is not an expert testifying as to the results of a scientific test but rather
the witness testifying as to her own recollection .... " 88 A.D.2d at 23, 452
N.Y.S.2d at 933 (Doerr, J., dissenting).
154. See infra notes 157-66 and accompanying text. See generally People v.
Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990).
155. In People v. Schreiner, 77 N.Y.2d 733, 573 N.E.2d 552, 570 N.Y.S.2d 464
(1991), the Court of Appeals held that hypnotically produced recall by the defend-
ant of his murder of the victim was inadmissible, since it had the same problems of
suggestibility as in Hughes. Id. at 738-39, 573 N.E.2d at 555, 570 N.Y.S.2d at 467.
Also, in People v. Hults, 76 N.Y.2d 190, 556 N.E.2d 1077, 557 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1990),
the court held that hypnotically produced recall cannot be used for reasons of im-
peachment, and is not barred by constitutional considerations of the right to con-
frontation. Id. at 197-99, 556 N.E.2d at 1081-82, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76. The
continuing attention by the court to these issues demonstrates the pervasive con-
cerns of applying the Frye standard to evidence produced through hypnosis. See
supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
156. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d at 537, 453 N.E.2d at 490,466 N.Y.S.2d at 261. Upon
noting that "[alt the center of the controversy is the question as to whether the
general rule governing the admissibility of scientific evidence applies to hypnotic
recall," the court examined how other jurisdictions treated this issue. Id. It com-
mented that "[iun the last few years... most courts considering the problem for the
first time have applied the Frye test, but differ as to its consequences." Id. at 538-
39, 453 N.E.2d at 491-92, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 262. The court eventually concluded
that "[iun short the law is in a state of flux and there is no rule which will entirely
satisfy all the demands of logic, policy and practicality." Id. at 540, 453 N.E.2d at
493, 466 N.Y.S.2d at 264.
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Another issue recently before the Court of Appeals is
whether the Frye test applies only to "hard" scientific evidence,
or whether it also applies to "soft" scientific evidence. 15 In Peo-
ple v. Taylor,158 a consolidation of two actions, 59 the Court of
Appeals addressed the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome.
In the first action, expert testimony regarding rape trauma syn-
drome was admitted to explain the victim's unwillingness to
name the defendant as her attacker, and to explain the appar-
ent calmness of the victim immediately after the rape. 60 Upon
conviction, the Appellate Division affirmed.' 61 In the second ac-
tion, testimony regarding rape trauma syndrome was admitted,
apparently with the purpose of showing that since the victim
demonstrated symptoms consistent with rape trauma syn-
drome, it was more likely that she was raped. 6 2 Upon a partial
conviction of the acts charged, the Appellate Division affirmed
the trial court's decision.'6
Upon review, the Court of Appeals held that testimony re-
garding rape trauma syndrome was admissible in the first ac-
tion under the Frye standard, but only to offer explanation to
the jury as to a possible justification for the victim's behavior. 6 4
In the second action, however, the court held that it should not
be admitted merely to suggest that a rape actually occurred
since the victim demonstrated certain, identifiable symptoms. 65
Although the court recognized that symptoms of rape trauma
157. This matter of application was foreshadowed in Hughes regarding hypno-
sis, but also applies to other forms of evidence as well. See supra notes 141-56 and
accompanying text. See also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of "hard" and "soft" scientific evidence.
158. 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990).
159. The two cases are People v. Banks, 145 A.D.2d 944, 536 N.Y.S.2d 316
(4th Dep't 1988) and People v. Taylor, 142 A.D.2d 410, 536 N.Y.S.2d 825 (2d Dep't
1988). In Taylor, an expert testified on the specifics of rape trauma syndrome.
Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 283, 552 N.E.2d at 132, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
160. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 283, 552 N.E.2d at 132, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
161. People v. Taylor, 142 A.D.2d 410, 530 N.Y.S.2d 825 (2d Dep't 1988).
162. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 284-85, 552 N.E.2d at 133, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
163. People v. Banks, 145 A.D.2d 944, 536 N.Y.S.2d 316 (4th Dep't 1988). The
defendant was convicted on four statutory counts but was acquitted on all forcible
counts. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d at 284-85, 552 N.E.2d at 133, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
164. Id. at 293, 552 N.E.2d at 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
165. Id. at 293, 552 N.E.2d at 138-39, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
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syndrome do not prove that a rape occurred, the syndrome may
help elucidate other material issues. 166
Thus, New York has stumbled across recurrent problems in
its use of the Frye test. First, courts have had a difficult time
determining what constitutes general acceptance in the scien-
tific community. 16 7 Second, although the Court of Appeals has
applied the Frye standard to soft scientific evidence, its ap-
proach in doing so suggests that the Frye standard cannot be
easily applied to methods of soft scientific evidence. 168 And
third, trial courts have felt compelled to tinker with the stan-
dard to ensure that the admitted evidence is reliable, sug-
gesting that some have doubts that the standard by itself
accurately measures reliability. 169 The federal courts have
wrestled with similar problems. 70 The Supreme Court recently
resolved some of these problems with its holding in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.171
166. Although the court recognized that "rape trauma syndrome encompasses
a broad range of symptoms and varied patterns of recovery," it then pointed out
that its recognition by the American Psychiatric Association, as well as the diag-
nostic criteria for posttraumatic stress syndrome, illustrate that the scientific com-
munity has generally accepted the fact that "rape as a stressor can have marked,
identifiable effects on a victim's behavior...." Id. at 286-87, 552 N.E.2d at 134-35,
552 N.Y.S.2d at 886-87. On this issue, the court concluded:
We are aware that rape trauma syndrome is a therapeutic and not a legal
concept. Physicians and rape counselors who treat victims of sexual assault
are not charged with the responsibility of ascertaining whether the victim is
telling the truth when she says that a rape occurred. That is part of the
truth-finding process implicated in a criminal trial. We do not believe, how-
ever, that the therapeutic origin of the syndrome renders it unreliable for
trial purposes. Thus, although we acknowledge that evidence of rape
trauma syndrome does not by itself prove that the complainant was raped,
we believe that this should not preclude its admissibility into evidence at
trial when relevance to a particular disputed issue has been demonstrated.
Id. at 287, 552 N.E.2d at 135, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
167. See infra notes 221-27 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 234-36 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
170. See generally supra part lI.D.2.
171. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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III. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
A. Facts
The Supreme Court ended the uncertainty among federal
courts by holding in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals172
that the Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the Frye stan-
dard.173 In Daubert, the petitioners were minor children with
severe birth defects. 74 An action on their behalf was brought
against respondent, alleging that the defects had been caused
by their mothers' ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription anti-
nausea drug. 75
B. Procedural History
After discovery, the respondents moved for summary judg-
ment, and offered the testimony of an expert 76 who concluded
that, based on published studies, no link had been established
between Bendectin and birth defects. 177 The petitioners re-
sponded by offering experts of their own 78 who concluded that a
"reanalysis" of previously published studies and "in vitro"179 and
"in vivo" °80 animal studies established a link between birth de-
fects and the use of Bendectin.' 8 '
The district court granted the motion for summary judg-
ment, 8 2 concluding that petitioners' evidence did not meet the
standard of general acceptance. 8 3 The Court of Appeals for the
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2793.
174. Id. at 2791.
175. Id.
176. The expert was Dr. Steven Lamm, a physician and epidemiologist, who
had had extensive education and experience regarding the effects of exposure to
chemicals. Id.
177. Id.
178. The Court noted that the experts of petitioners were similarly well-
credentialed in determining the risks of chemical exposure. Id.
179. "In vitro" tests are those which are conducted in an artificial environ-
ment such as test tubes. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 723 (5th Unabr. Law-
yers' ed. 1982).
180. "In vivo" studies are those which are conducted in the living body. Id.
181. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
182. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D.
Cal. 1989).
183. Id. at 575. Specifically, since the expert testimony was not based on epi-
demiological data, such testimony would not be admissible to prove causation.




Ninth Circuit affirmed, 84 concluding that petitioners' evidence
did not satisfy the Frye standard and was thus inadmissible. 185
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari 86 to resolve the
conflict among the circuits on the application of the standard. 8 7
C. Majority Holding
In a seven member majority opinion, the Court held that
the Frye standard was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, but the Court avoided the conclusion that the Frye stan-
dard was inherently flawed.188 It further established an
analytical approach in determining the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence. 8 9 In the majority opinion, Justice Black-
mun reasoned that Federal Rule of Evidence 702 specifically
governs expert testimony, and makes no mention of the general
acceptance standard. 190 Further, the "liberal thrust" of the
Rules would not be served by the conservative Frye standard.191
The Court concluded: "Frye made 'general acceptance' the ex-
clusive test for admitting expert scientific testimony. That aus-
tere standard, absent from and incompatible with the Federal
Rules of Evidence, should not be applied in federal trials."192
D. Reasoning
The Court thus posits a mode of analysis in determining
the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. The first step is to
determine, pursuant to Rule 104(a),193 whether the expert is to
184. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
185. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792 (citing Daubert, 951 F.2d at 1131).
186. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
187. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2792.
188. Id. at 2793. As Justice Blackmun wrote:
The merits of the Frye test have been much debated, and scholarship on its
proper scope and application is legion. Petitioners' primary attack, how-
ever, is not on the content but on the continuing authority of the rule. They
contend that the Frye test was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. We agree.
Id. (citations omitted).
189. 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
190. Id. at 2794.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Rule 104(a) states that "[pireliminary questions concerning the qualifica-
tion of a person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court...." FED. R. EVD. 104(a).
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testify to scientific knowledge; 94 the second step is to determine
whether such testimony "will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand or determine a fact in issue." 195 This analysis requires "a
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodol-
ogy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of
whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied
to the facts in issue."196
In its analysis, the Court reasoned that Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence 197 embodied requirements that novel
scientific evidence be relevant and reliable before it can be ad-
mitted. 198 It interpreted Rule 702's reference to "scientific
knowledge" as establishing a standard of evidentiary reliabil-
ity.199 The majority reasoned, "[t]he adjective 'scientific' implies
a grounding in the methods and procedures of science. Simi-
larly, the word 'knowledge' connotes more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation .... [I]n order to qualify as 'scien-
tific knowledge,' an inference or assertion must be derived by
the scientific method."2°°
The Court also interpreted the passage in Rule 702 to re-
quire that such evidence must "assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue"201 as
establishing a standard of relevance. 2 2 "Rule 702's 'helpful-
ness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to the perti-
nent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility."
20 3
The Court went on to suggest several factors for the trial
court to consider in making these determinations: 20 4 whether
the theory or technique can be or has been tested;20 5 whether
the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review and
publication; 20 6 the technique's known or potential rate of er-
194. 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. See supra note 72.
198. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 2795 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 702).
202. Id. at 2796-97.
203. Id. at 2796.
204. Id. at 2796-97.
205. Id. at 2796.
206. Id. at 2797.
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ror;20 7 and whether the technique has been generally accepted
in the relevant scientific community. 2 8
In response to the concern that abandoning the Frye test
will cause a "free-for-all" of unproven scientific theories, the
Court stressed that the adversary system and currently ex-
isting procedural devices can adequately safeguard against this
danger. 209 Also, addressing the fear that the trial judge's
gatekeeping role in determining the admissibility of such evi-
dence would frustrate the search for truth, the Court empha-
sized the differing constraints on law and science.
210
E. Chief Justice Rehnquist-Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part
In his concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist 21 agreed that
the Frye test was superseded by the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 212 but stressed that the Court needed only to respond to
the issue of whether the standard was superseded, and should
have avoided discussion as to other issues.21 3 One of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist's concerns was that the application of Rule 702
suggested by the majority places the federal trial court judge in
a difficult position.21 4 Criticizing the criteria offered by the ma-
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 2798.
210. Id. at 2798-99. Justice Blackmun offered an eloquent articulation of the
differing demands of science and law:
It is true that open debate is an essential part of both legal and scientific
analyses. Yet there are important differences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for truth in the laboratory. Scientific conclu-
sions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the other hand, must re-
solve disputes finally and quickly. The scientific project is advanced by
broad and wide-ranging consideration of a multitude of hypotheses, for
those that are incorrect will eventually be shown to be so, and that in itself
is an advance. Conjectures that are probably wrong are of little use, how-
ever, in the project of reaching a quick, final, and binding legal judgment-
often of great consequence-about a particular set of events in the past.
Id. at 2798.
211. Chief Justice Rehnquist was joined in his concurrence by Justice Ste-
vens. Id. at 2799.
212. Id.
213. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist proffered that another issue before the Court
was that "if Frye remains valid, whether it requires expert scientific testimony to
have been subjected to a peer-review process in order to be admissible." Id.
214. Id. at 2800.
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jority in assessing the reliability and relevance of scientific evi-
dence, Rehnquist expressed this concern: "I do not doubt that
Rule 702 confides to the judge some gatekeeping responsibility
in deciding questions of the admissibility of proffered expert tes-
timony. But I do not think it imposes on them either the obliga-
tion or the authority to become amateur scientists in order to
perform that role."215 Thus, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded
that the Court's reasoning on how to use Rule 702 raises more
questions than it answers. 216
IV. Analysis
New York State decisions demonstrate that the Frye stan-
dard has proven untenable in determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence. 217 The inflexible requirement in Frye
that a technique be generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity can result in the exclusion of relevant evidence. 218 The am-
biguity of "general acceptance" and "scientific community"
results in the inconsistent and possibly selective application of
the standard. 21 9 The holding in Daubert, which furthers the ju-
dicial trend away from the Frye standard, 220 frees trial courts
from these flaws, and allows judges more freedom in determin-
ing whether such evidence is reliable and relevant to a material
issue.
A. Problems with Frye
The first problem of the Frye standard in New York courts
is that the requirement of general acceptance has led to confu-
215. Id.
216. Id. Both Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun alluded to the
unique characteristics of the amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Court in aid of
its decision. Id. at 2798, 2799. Chief Justice Rehnquist described it best:
Twenty-two amicus briefs have been filed in the case, and indeed the Court's
opinion contains no less than 37 citations to amicus briefs and other secon-
dary sources. The various briefs filed in this case are markedly different
from typical briefs, .. . they deal with definitions of scientific knowledge,
scientific method, scientific validity, and peer review-in short, matters far
afield from the expertise of judges.
Id. at 2799.
217. See generally supra part H.D.
218. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
220. See generally supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
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sion and inconsistent application. The holdings in People v. Le-
one and People v. Middleton clarified this requirement by
holding that a party does not need to establish universal sup-
port for a technique in order to satisfy the general acceptance
requirement.221 But the New York Court of Appeals has
avoided placing a specific percentage of experts as a threshold
requirement.222 The problem is further amplified by the ambi-
guity in the term "scientific community." The flaw can lead to
inconsistent application, and more focus is placed on what per-
centage constitutes general acceptance, and less focus is placed
on what should be the primary issue: is the evidence relevant to
a material issue?223
Second, the ambiguity surrounding "scientific community"
has led to inconsistent application of the standard.224 New York
courts have struggled with how inclusive the community should
be.225 The ambiguity also allows judges to be selective in apply-
221. See discussion supra part II.D.2.
222. In Leone and Middleton, the Court of Appeals did not specify whether the
Frye test is satisfied with a showing of 90%, 75%, or even 51% support of the new
scientific technique. See supra notes 121-24, 135-38 and accompanying text. But
inconsistencies still abound. In People v. Bethune, 105 A.D.2d 262, 484 N.Y.S.2d
577 (2d Dep't 1984), the court concluded that bite mark evidence was admissible
because the techniques used by the expert in reaching his opinion "are viewed by a
majority of experts in the field as accurate and reliable." Id. at 268, 484 N.Y.S.2d
at 582. It further noted that "defendant's own expert made no claim... that a
majority of forensic odontologists view identification of aged bite mark scars as
inaccurate or unreliable." Id. at 268-69, 484 N.Y.S.2d at 582. The reasoning of the
court suggests that a simple majority rules. But at least one court has suggested
that it may reject novel scientific evidence, even if it is generally accepted by a
majority of experts. In People v. Mohit, 153 Misc. 2d 22, 579 N.Y.S.2d 990 (West-
chester County Ct. 1992), the court concluded that "if a well-respected minority
within a given scientific community rejects as unreliable a particular procedure,
technique, or theory, the court possesses the authority to agree with that minority
view and exclude the evidence offered." Id. at 24, 579 N.Y.S.2d at 992.
223. See Giannelli, supra note 2, at 1226, for a discussion of how the "general
acceptance" standard may obscure the crucial issue of whether such a technique is
relevant to a material issue at trial.
224. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
225. Several cases have wrestled with this issue, knowing that the size of the
field will affect whether evidence is admissible. In People v. Seda, 139 Misc. 2d
834, 529 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1988), the court articulated the ra-
tionale for broadening the scope of the scientific community:
Problems with the Frye standard also arise when the specialized community
which may appropriately be called upon to judge whether a procedure has
gained general acceptance is too narrow....
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ing the standard. The trial judge may admit or exclude evi-
dence based on how the scientific community is constituted. If
the judge includes only those who administer the test or tech-
nique, the evidence is usually admitted. If the judge includes
experts in related or tangential fields, the general acceptance
standard is less likely to be satisfied. 226 The flaw in this ap-
proach is that the continuing ambiguity of the term leads to in-
consistent application and inconsistent results, not that one
way of constituting the scientific community is more advanta-
geous than the other.227
Third, New York trial courts have demonstrated a lack of
confidence with the Frye standard in determining whether
novel scientific evidence should be admitted.22 For example,
some courts require that there be a judicial determination of a
test's reliability, as well as a determination by the scientific
community. 2 9 Although this more stringent test has been over-
The scientific tradition expects independent verification of new proce-
dures. When other scientists analyze and repeat the tests, they counteract
the dangers of biased reporting. It is scientists not responsible for the origi-
nal research that confirm its validity.
Id. at 837, 846, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 933, 939 (quoting People v. Young, 391 N.W.2d
270, 283 (Mich. 1986)). An argument for shrinking the scope of the scientific com-
munity was made by the court in People v. Quinn, 153 Misc. 2d 139, 580 N.Y.S.2d
818 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1991). The court dismissed a concern that those tes-
tifying as to the reliability of a drug test have a personal stake. "But in consider-
ing defendant's argument, the court is left to ponder just who... might be capable
of giving relevant testimony.... " Id. at 154, 580 N.Y.S.2d at 828. But see People
v. Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d 417, 440-41, 633 N.E.2d 451,464-65, 611 N.Y.S.2d 97, 110-11
(1994) (Kaye, C.J., concurring) (refusing to accept testimony of scientific experts
with "commercial interests" in the technique).
226. This constitution of the "scientific community" may sometimes result in
the opposite effect. An example of this can be found in Wesley. In determining
under the Frye test whether DNA fingerprinting evidence is admissible, the major-
ity placed great weight in the testimony of experts in molecular biology, population
genetics, and restriction enzymes, all of whom testified as to the test's acceptance.
Wesley, 83 N.Y.2d at 424 n.4, 633 N.E.2d at 455 n.4, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 101 n.4. But
as the concurring opinion notes, "[nione of these witnesses... was expert in foren-
sic DNA analysis." Id. at 438, 633 N.E.2d at 463, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
227. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
228. See supra parts II.D.2-.3.
229. See, e.g., People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 706, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367
(Sup. Ct. Crim. T. Kings County 1978) ("This court therefore concludes that the
standard which must be applied to the admissibility... of any scientific test, is the
twofold test of reliability and general scientific acceptance."). See supra note 124
and accompanying text.
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ruled by the Court of Appeals,230 it has emerged in other
forms.23 ' In addition, some courts have devised more stringent
tests than the Frye test itself to be used when dealing with the
admissibility of new and complex forms of scientific evidence. 23 2
These attempts to modify the Frye standard to "fit" modern sci-
entific techniques may lead to inconsistent application and re-
sults. 23 3 At the least, these attempts suggest a lack of
confidence by courts in the Frye standard to accurately deter-
mine the reliability of complex tests or theories. At most, they
illustrate the recognition by trial courts that the Frye standard
has outlived its purpose for determining the admissibility of
novel scientific evidence.
Fourth, the inability of the Frye standard to determine the
reliability of "soft" evidence has arguably led to a softening of
the standard234 and an inefficient manner of indicating judicial
acceptance of a psychological or psychiatric technique.2 5 Rely-
ing on the Court of Appeals to take judicial notice of a psycho-
logical syndrome under limited circumstances at trial would be
inefficient; a great deal of litigation would necessarily occur
230. See supra text accompanying notes 125-39.
231. In the most recently proposed Code of Evidence, for example, the test
articulated for admissibility was twofold: a technique must satisfy a judicial deter-
mination of reliability, as well as general acceptance in the scientific community.
N.Y.S. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A PROPOSED CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE STATE
OF NEW YORK § 702(b), at 166 (1991).
232. See, e.g., People v. Wesley, 183 A.D.2d 75, 589 N.Y.S.2d 197 (3d Dep't
1992) (holding that in DNA fingerprinting cases, evidence of such must satisfy
both Frye and the court's own determination of reliability), aff'd, 83 N.Y.2d 417,
633 N.E.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1994); People v. Mohit, 153 Misc. 2d 22, 26, 579
N.Y.S.2d 990, 993 (Westchester County Ct. 1992) (setting forth a three-prong anal-
ysis to determine whether DNA fingerprinting may be admitted in court under the
Frye standard); People v. Seda, 139 Misc. 2d 834, 529 N.Y.S.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1988) (holding that the unique conditions of electrophoresis analysis are
not measurable by the Frye standard and that a two prong analysis is required).
233. See supra part II.D.2.
234. The court's decision in People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131,
552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990), is arguably a softening of the usually conservative stance
toward the admissibility of evidence. Under certain circumstances, some forms of
scientific evidence, although arguably not generally accepted enough to decide ulti-
mate issues, may be admitted for other issues related to the trial. More signifi-
cantly, the court's conclusion in Taylor that the Frye standard applied to rape
trauma syndrome, despite some recognized problems, suggests that the court is
prepared to expand Frye's reach to techniques other than the "hard" sciences. See
supra notes 157-66 and accompanying text.
235. See supra part II.D.3.
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before such judicial notice would take place, and then only for
the particular method or technique at issue. This inefficiency is
heightened when trial court judges have the discretionary
power to admit the same evidence under the same or similar
limited circumstances. 236
One possible reason for these problems with the Frye test
may be the assumptions by the court in Frye regarding science.
In devising the test, the Frye court did not cite case law or other
outside sources to support the standard.237 This lack of specific
references may suggest that the test was developed based on
commonly accepted views of science at the time, views which
might have changed since the time of Frye.238
B. Applying Daubert
Since New York, unlike a majority of other states, 239 has
not codified its rules of evidence to reflect the Federal Rules of
236. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, for example, trial judges can limit
the admissibility of evidence under Rule 104(a), so long as it is admissible under
Rule 402, and is not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Also, under New York case law, trial court judges have been given a great deal of
discretion in allowing expert testimony. See Selkowitz v. County of Nassau, 45
N.Y.2d 97, 101-02, 379 N.E.2d 1140, 1142-43, 408 N.Y.S.2d 10-12 (1978).
237. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
238. During the late nineteenth century, the public saw science as attaining
'an aura of special reliability and trustworthiness" and that any evidence deemed
"scientific" might be viewed by the jury as having a "mystic infallibility." Wayne
D. Greenstone, Junk Science, Junk Justice, 36 A.T.L.A. L. RpTR. 263 (Sept. 1993).
See also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1974). This atti-
tude may explain some of the current flaws with the test. The Court in Frye did
not define what constitutes the "scientific community," nor did it illustrate what
percentage is sufficient to constitute "general acceptance." With the view that sci-
ence is a mysterious entity with "mystic infallibility," there would be no need for
defining what the "scientific community" includes, or what numbers in support of a
technique constitute general acceptance, because at the time both were seen as
clearly defined entities. The test was devised in a time where sbience assumed a
different role in society than it does today, which may be contributing to the grow-
ing dissatisfaction with the standard.
239. Thirty-four states have codified their rules of evidence much like the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, including Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware,
Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire,, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See
Barbara Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify-That is the Question: A Study of New




Evidence, 240 the Supreme Court's holding in Daubert does not
hold any immediate persuasive authority for New York to over-
turn the Frye standard. But the holding in Daubert illustrates
the increasing trend of jurisdictions to replace the Frye stan-
dard with an approach based on relevancy and reliability.241
The Court's reasoning is made more appealing because its mode
of analysis would effectively correct many problems with the
Frye standard now evident in New York.
First, the Court's emphasis on whether novel scientific evi-
dence is reliable and relevant is preferable to whether such a
technique is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Daubert's emphasis avoids the problems one has in determining
how many experts satisfy the general acceptance standard. 2
The Supreme Court's analysis in Daubert focuses on eviden-
tiary reliability and relevance.24 3 In contrast, the general ac-
ceptance standard shifts attention away from relevance and
reliability, since one of the assumptions of the test is that a ma-
jority of experts would indicate reliability. Of course, the party
seeking admissibility under the Daubert analysis must demon-
strate that such evidence is reliable and relevant. But the party
is no longer limited by the strict confines of general acceptance
to prove reliability and relevance. 24 The Daubert analysis thus
240. New York has attempted to codify its rules of evidence several times.
The first major attempt, in 1982, fashioned the rules of evidence very similar to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See N.Y.S. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF Evi-
DENCE FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK (West 1982). The last major attempt, in 1991,
codified a standard even tougher than Frye itself: it required not only general ac-
ceptance, but also a separate judicial determination of the technique's reliability.
See N.Y.S. LAW REVISION COMMISSION, supra note 231, § 702(b), at 166. See gener-
ally Salken, supra note 239, at 659-62.
241. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 198-208 and accompanying text. The Court's analysis of
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 suggests that the term "scientific knowledge" con-
tains within it a requirement of evidentiary reliability, while the "helpfulness"
standard establishes relevance of the technique to a material issue at trial. Id.
Although New York does not have a common law rule comparable to Rule 702, it is,
in one sense, half-way there: any "expert opinion is proper when it would help to
clarify an issue calling for professional or technical knowledge, possessed by the
expert and beyond the ken of the typical juror." DeLong v. County of Erie, 60
N.Y.2d 296, 307, 457 N.E.2d 717, 722, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611, 617 (1983).
244. The Daubert Court avoided overturning the content of the Frye test and
maintained its viability, at least in part, by keeping it as a factor in determining
the admissibility of such evidence. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow
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allows relevant evidence to be admitted, even though it would
not satisfy the Frye test.245
Second, the flexibility of the analysis suggested by the
Supreme Court avoids the problems concerning whether the
Frye standard applies to hard and soft evidence, 246 and how the
standard should be modified to better measure the reliability of
new or complicated techniques.247 The Frye standard, originally
applied to a hard scientific technique,248 was never devised to
apply to expert testimony such as psychological profiles or psy-
chiatric classifications or syndromes. 249 Reliability of a psycho-
logical profile is harder to substantiate than techniques based
on physics or mathematics; the emphasis is on qualitative, or
"subjective," rather than quantitative, or "objective" criteria. 250
The Supreme Court's analysis in Daubert would allow psycho-
logical evidence to come in, with the judge's discretion, either
Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796-97 (1993). See also supra notes 204-08
and accompanying text. An argument could be made that the Court's holding does
little to weaken Frye's hold on the federal circuits; instead, the Court's reasoning
seems designed to technically overrule Frye, but still allow lower courts to use the
standard in allowing scientific evidence. One consequence of the Court's holding is
that previously conflicting circuit court decisions under Frye will now be seen as
harmonious within the scope of Rule 702's inquiry. In the Court's own words: "The
inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is, we emphasize, a flexible one." Daubert, 113 S.
Ct. at 2797.
245. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
248. The technique in Frye was a deception test. Although the Court admit-
ted that the test was not generally accepted among "physiological and psychologi-
cal authorities," the results of the test were objectively measurable. Frye, 293 F. at
1014.
249. However, it is true that the Frye Court acknowledged that "psychological
authorities" were a relevant group in determining whether the deception test was
generally accepted. See id. at 1014. But see supra notes 157-66 and accompanying
text.
250. See People v. Collins, 94 Misc. 2d 704, 405 N.Y.S.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. Crim.
T. Kings County 1978). In Collins, the court, in assessing whether voice spectro-
graphic analysis should be admitted, put forth the requirement that "the stan-
dards for interpretation... must be objective rather than subjective; they must be
definite rather than vague; they must be capable of being articulated; and the con-
clusions of any examiner must be capable of being scrutinized to determine
whether they comport with a definite set of standards." Id. at 718, 405 N.Y.S.2d at
374. In examining a study advocating the reliability of spectrographic evidence,
the court concluded that "subjective factors mentioned [in the study] would seem to
cast a good deal of doubt on the reliability of this technique which, we must re-
member, is being put forth as a scientific test." Id. at 719, 405 N.Y.S.2d at 374.
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with limited or unlimited admissibility, based on the degree of
reliability demonstrated.
Third, the flexible approach makes admissibility dependent
on criteria which measure the reliability and relevance of a par-
ticular technique. The factors suggested by the Supreme Court
to determine reliability would free New York trial judges from
having to adapt the Frye standard to more complicated scien-
tific techniques. 251 By looking at relevant factors, such as peer
review and the rate of error, along with general acceptance, a
judge may more easily determine whether simple or complex
scientific techniques are reliable and thus admissible in evi-
dence. The pivotal contribution of the Daubert approach is that
it focuses judicial inquiry onto a scientific technique's reliabil-
ity, rather than whether the technique has simply garnered a
majority of support in a community of experts.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's concern that the relevancy ap-
proach would place judges in the role of amateur scientists 25 2
ignores a more important concern. Judges must ensure that ev-
idence sought to be admitted satisfies standards of reliability
and relevance. This gatekeeping responsibility pertains both to
those judges applying the Frye standard as well as those apply-
ing the Daubert standard. But the general acceptance standard
shifts attention away from this inquiry, and instead focuses on
counting heads. The Daubert standard shifts the judge's atten-
tion back to concerns of relevance and reliability. Also, Chief
Justice Rehnquist's criticism ignores the reality that much
modern-day evidence consists of scientific techniques and tests.
The trial judge, rather than simply noting the majority in a
community of scientists, should ensure through his own exami-
nation that techniques admitted as evidence be sufficiently rele-
vant and reliable. Chief Justice Rehnquist is correct that the
majority's approach in Daubert places more responsibility on
trial court judges; judges must assume these responsibilities to
251. The Supreme Court also made clear that the suggested list of factors is
not exhaustive; it acknowledged other factors suggested by commentators which
focus on the reliability of the evidence, although it avoided any decision as to the
worth of these other factors. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797 n.12. "To the extent that
they focus on the reliability of evidence as ensured by the scientific validity of its
underlying principles, all these versions may well have merit, although we express
no opinion regarding any of their particular details." Id.
252. See discussion supra part III.E.
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make certain that any admissible evidence satisfy judicial stan-
dards of relevance and reliability.
The argument has been made that the conservative nature
of the Frye standard is advantageous because of an assumption
that a conservative approach would ensure greater reliabil-
ity.253 But the issue of whether or not the test is conservative is
not relevant. The appropriate inquiry is whether the test al-
lows relevant and reliable evidence to be admitted, while ex-
cluding unreliable or irrelevant evidence. Some courts have
noted that the Frye test fails in this regard. 254 Reliability can be
demonstrated in other ways, such as those factors suggested by
the Supreme Court and others. 255
One may argue that disillusionment of the Frye standard
will lead to an avalanche of unreliable scientific testimony al-
lowed into courtrooms to justify liability on strange theories.
But this concern ignores the Court's analysis: the Frye standard
can still be used to determine a technique's reliability, but it no
longer remains the sole standard by which to judge the admissi-
bility of such evidence. 256
Further, evidence which is not reliable or relevant to a ma-
terial issue will be excluded under the Daubert approach. This
more flexible approach may have the surprising impact of ex-
cluding unreliable evidence which may be admissible under the
Frye test. Admissibility under Frye is highly dependent on
what constitutes the scientific community.257 The Daubert ap-
proach, in contrast, focuses its concerns on whether the scien-
tific technique is reliable and relevant. This approach makes it
less likely that a small group of people will constitute a "com-
munity" and thus justify admissibility of an untested procedure.
Even though New York has not codified its rules of evidence
to reflect the Federal Rules of Evidence, New York's principles
of relevance as articulated in its common law allow for the pos-
253. See supra note 47.
254. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
255. See WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 18, 702[03], at 702-41 to 702-42
(1988). Other factors include: "the expert's qualifications and stature, the use
which has been made of the new technique, the potential rate of error, the exist-
ence of specialized literature, and the novelty of the invention." Id.
256. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.




sibility of a more flexible standard.258 By focusing on matters of
relevance and reliability rather than on debating ambiguities of
an outdated standard, New York courts would be more produc-
tive in determining if such evidence is relevant to a material
issue.
V. Conclusion
The Frye standard in New York has proven untenable. Its
ambiguous terms have led to inconsistent application, and the
rigid requirements have excluded relevant evidence from being
considered by a jury. The Supreme Court's analysis in Daubert
offers a more flexible alternative to the Frye test which assures
that more relevant and reliable scientific evidence will be con-
sidered by the fact finder in determining the resolution of legal
disputes. The highlight of the Daubert standard is that admis-
sibility of novel scientific evidence hinges on its relevance and
reliability, not on its acceptance by a community of experts.
The Court of Appeals has refused to embrace the Daubert
standard in Wesley, and has upheld the use of the Frye test in
determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. Until
a more flexible standard like that in Daubert is incorporated,
the Frye test-with all its inherent ambiguities and difficulties
in application-remains the law in New York.
Brian W. Burke*
258. Relevant evidence in New York has been defined as "'evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.'" People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 17, 27, 371 N.E.2d 456, 460, 400 N.Y.S.2d
735, 740 (1977) (quoting UNIF. R. EVID. 401 (1974)), cert. denied; 438 U.S. 914
(1978) and 435 U.S. 998 (1978). New York trial judges also have the discretion to
exclude evidence if its admissibility may result in undue prejudice:
But even if the evidence is proximately relevant, it may be rejected if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger that its admission would pro-
long the trial to an unreasonable extent without any corresponding advan-
tage; or would confuse the main issue and mislead the jury; or unfairly
surprise a party; or create substantial danger of undue prejudice to one of
the parties.
JEROME PRINCE, RIcHARDsoN ON EVIDENCE § 147, at 117 (10th ed. 1973).
* To my wife Ann Marie.
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